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Chapter 5 
The multiple meanings of fish: Policy disconnections in Australian seafood governance 
 
In Australia, fisheries management jurisdictions at the state and federal level regulate 
fisheries according to sustainability objectives contained in legislation and related formal 
regulatory measures such as harvest strategies and management plans. The current system for 
governing fisheries was shaped in the 1990s against the backdrop of concerns about 
dramatically overfished stocks such as gemfish and orange roughy, which increased public 
awareness of environmental issues and employment-reducing restructuring of major 
commercial fisheries. Contemporary fisheries management objectives thus came to be 
focused on sustainability. In this vision of sustainability, fish are imagined as biological 
stocks and the amounts of fish of particular species is the key indicator regarding availability 
of the resource for current and future generations. Economic objectives are narrowly 
considered and social aspects of sustainability are not—fish are not treated as sources of 
food, culture, or livelihoods. Once fish enter the postharvest supply chain, the policy 
imaginary changes and they are regulated as a food commodity. In this space, governors for 
consumer protection manage products to ensure they are safe to eat and set the conditions for 
sale, including what information needs to be available to consumers. Seafood supply is 
guaranteed through trade flows, so sustainability is not regulated in the postharvest part of the 
supply chain. Sustainability is treated as a consumer value to be left to the initiative of the 
private sector, for example, through branding seafood product with ecolabels.  
This chapter addresses the effects of this disconnection between the meanings of fish 
as a natural resource and fish as food, between the goals of the governors in the harvest and 
in the postharvest space. We have analyzed qualitative data—policy documents, interviews, 
and event observations—for insights into the consequences of this policy disconnect, as well 
as possible tools to address it. The chapter begins by exploring the main features of the 
present regulatory environment. First, the regulatory burdens of fisheries management—the 
costs of regulation imposed on those subjected to compliance with it—are different for 
domestically caught seafood and for the imported seafood that sits beside it on the 
 
supermarket shelf or menu. This creates a risk that the final point-of-sale business may 
choose to attribute an incorrect place of origin if the expected compliance risk is outweighed 
by the margin improvement flowing from misleading labeling. Second, the available 
voluntary tools for labeling seafood as having been sustainably harvested, such as Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) certification, are targeted to high-value, economically efficient 
fisheries. MSC certification is too expensive for the small-scale operators that constitute a 
large part of the Australian fishing sector. Finally, a history of conflict between Australian 
professional and recreational fishers and the conservation movement has damaged public 
perceptions of professional fisheries. This has been compounded by a lack of effective public 
communication about the relatively strong management of commercial fishing by Australian 
governments since the 1990s, leading to the situation in which the fishing industry fears the 
loss of public trust in their activity. These three situations arise from inaction by government 
on fisheries sustainability after the seafood is harvested to enable a level playing field for 
sustainable produce. The absence of this level playing field risks advantaging imports over 
domestic seafood, and product from unregulated fisheries over sustainably caught fish. 
An attempt has been made to address this policy disconnect through country-of-origin 
labeling, based on the assumption that, because Australian fisheries are fairly well regulated, 
this would act as a proxy for sustainability requirements in the retail sphere. Another possible 
way to address the disconnect is through requiring importers to demonstrate that their seafood 
shipments were legally caught. Regulatory bodies in the European Union and the United 
States have addressed possibly unfair market competition between imported seafood, which 
may not have been produced under stringent fisheries management, and domestically 
produced seafood that has been subject to such management through requiring traceability 
documentation to demonstrate the fish comes from a regulated fishery.  
 
Governing Fish, Governing Seafood 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the main goal of fisheries management in Australia 
was the development of fisheries as an economic sector, driven by state and federal 
governments to maximize the opportunity offered by apparently large stocks along the 
Australian coast (Clark 2017, 101). Rapid development of commercial fisheries from the 
1950s led to plummeting stocks of southern bluefin tuna and gemfish in the 1980s, and 
orange roughy in the early 1990s (Clark 2017, 106–108). These fishery collapses occurred 
against a background of increased scrutiny from environmental groups and conflict for 
resource access with the recreational fishing sector. In Australia, recreational fishing groups 
 
have successfully lobbied to have professional fishing excluded from certain waterways and 
continue to push for further restrictions on professional fishing (King and O’Meara 2018). 
These conflicts over resource access—episodes of collapsed fisheries and media coverage of 
overfishing as a global problem—have damaged the public image of professional fishing and 
brought about a profound revision of government regulatory objectives. Regulation has 
shifted from industry expansion to the pursuit of biological sustainability through the 
monitoring of stocks, restricting entrants and preventing overfishing: 
Fish are a renewable, but not inexhaustible, resource. They are subject to the well-
recognized potential for a “tragedy of the commons,” where the unregulated efforts of 
individual fishers deplete the resource. Governments must therefore limit catches to 
sustainably manage resources and, where there is competition between fishers, 
determine how access is to be shared. (Productivity Commission 2016, 3) 
This focus on sustainability crystallized in the adoption of Ecologically Sustainable 
Development (ESD) principles; the definition and core objectives of ESD for Australia are 
contained in the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development endorsed by the 
Council of Australian Governments in 1992, integrated in the Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) and in the different Fisheries Acts of the states. The 
three components of sustainability—social, economic, and environmental—were taken into 
account in the high-level objectives of the legislation. However, the primary effect of the 
legislation addressed the biological component of sustainability, complemented in some cases 
by economic objectives (Barclay 2012). The operational objectives in management plans and 
harvest strategies rely strongly on the conception of fish as a stock whose existence in 
sufficient numbers is the fundamental goal of fisheries management: 
The Status of Australian Fish Stock Reports are a series of assessments of the 
biological sustainability of a broad range of wild-caught fish stocks against a 
nationally agreed framework. The reports examine whether the abundance of fish and 
the level of harvest from the stock are sustainable.  
 The 2018 reports focus solely on the status of fish stocks. The status 
classifications do not consider broader ecosystem impacts of fishing or social and 
economic considerations that some consumers may be interested in. 
(Fisheries Research and Development Corporation [FRDC] 2018a, paras 1, 9) 
 
The economic component of ESD is present in some fisheries legislation, such as the 
aim to maximize the “net economic returns to the Australian community” (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1991, 2) of the harvest. Economic measurements of the value of Australian fisheries 
remain unsophisticated (Pascoe et al. 2016) and are undefined in many jurisdictions. 
Governments have not clearly articulated who should benefit from the exploitation of fishery 
resources: “Is the objective of the fishery to provide employment, food, reward 
entrepreneurship, generate income for the community, provide recreational utility or some 
other goal?” (Emery et al. 2017, 143). The vagueness of economic objectives, coupled with 
the disregard for the social component of sustainability (Barclay 2012, 38) means that fish 
stocks are managed to be available for future generations, but beyond that the goals are 
unclear.  
The governance arrangements oriented to maintain fish stocks cease once the fish 
leaves the wharf and enters the supply chain as seafood. In the postharvest space, seafood is 
categorized as a food product, and governance arrangements aim at ensuring market 
competition and that food is safe to eat. This affects both imports and domestic product. 
Imports are subject to border controls for food safety and biosecurity but not to the 
demonstration of sustainability, in line with a trade regime in which the former constitute an 
acceptable trade barrier but environmental provisions have been traditionally problematic. 
Apart from the border control of biosecurity, the main regulatory responsibilities for seafood 
in the postharvest space are transferred to food authorities and consumer protection 
frameworks. In these frameworks, the government’s ESD objectives are not pursued in the 
legislation or policies of the food safety and consumer protection authorities. In this 
framework, food safety is the object of mandatory information, followed by preventative 
health. Other consumer values issues, including environmental values, are left up to industry-
initiated regulation.  
Regulatory action in relation to food safety, preventative health and new technologies 
should primarily be initiated by government and referenced in the Food Standards 
Code. Regulatory action in relation to consumer values issues should generally be 
initiated by industry and referenced to consumer protection legislation. (Blewett et al. 
2011, 48) 
The private sector thus emerges as a governor to fill the regulatory gap regarding 
sustainability, that is, to certify the sustainability of the seafood in the marketplace and to 
 
communicate this attribute to consumers. Internationally, some companies along supply 
chains use a variety of certification programs and associated marketing tools provided by 
independent organizations to demonstrate sustainability claims and differentiate their product 
to consumers (Auld 2014, 1). Such programs have contributed to the environmental 
regulation of fisheries and constitute one of the prime examples of global nonstate regulatory 
mechanisms (Hatanaka, Bain and Busch 2005, 355). Some Australian fisheries have been 
active in seeking certification. In March 2000, the Western Rock Lobster Fishery was the first 
fishery in the world to become MSC certified and, in 2017, the first to have been recertified 
for a fourth time (MSC 2018). In 2012, the Northern Prawn Fishery was the first tropical 
prawn fishery in the world to be MSC certified, achieving one of the best MSC scores ever 
(Hadjimichael and Hegland 2016, 131). Western Australia is also the site of a collaboration 
between MSC and the state government to enable simultaneous preassessment of different 
fisheries by regions (Bellchambers et al. 2016). However, certifications cover a fraction of 
the seafood sold in Australia. This partial coverage of sustainability concerns in the 
postharvest space through private sector tools fails to solve the regulatory gap and has a 
number of effects. 
 
The Effects of Policy Disconnections 
The absence of government regulation for sustainable fisheries in the postharvest space has a 
number of implications. It produces a regulatory gap in that Australian fisheries are regulated 
for sustainability whereas imports are not subject to the demonstration of sustainability. The 
different sustainability requirements for domestic and imported seafood may result in a price 
advantage for less sustainably sourced seafood, thus reducing economic opportunities of 
fisheries subject to regulatory measures, whether domestic or foreign. The regulatory gap is 
especially relevant in a market characterized by a strong dependency on imports—in 2015–
2016, imports made up 67 percent of the total consumption of seafood in Australia (Hogan 
2017, 34). 
The imbalance in the regulatory requirements is exacerbated by the partial success of 
private governance in the certification and communication of sustainability credentials. 
Certification of the sustainability of seafood remains restricted to the large-scale, 
industrialized, economically efficient fisheries and large supply chain actors. This presents a 
problem for the small, family-owned fishing businesses that make up the majority of 
Australian fisheries (FRDC and Ridge Partners 2015, 71). As an interviewee pointed out, 
“The problem for Australia for going into the market and demonstrating sustainability is that 
 
you’ve got the haves and have nots” (research funder, pers. comm., November 14, 2017). The 
have nots—those domestic fisheries subject to strong fisheries regulation but unable to 
demonstrate their sustainability credentials in the marketplace—thus compete in the retail 
space without the capacity to use voluntary tools to communicate their sustainability 
credentials. This means they compete directly with less regulated fisheries with lower 
regulatory costs. The result is a price disadvantage for seafood from more sustainable 
fisheries.  
Another problem arising from lack of government involvement on sustainability 
outside the regulation of fisheries per se is that governments have not effectively 
communicated to the public that most Australian fisheries have since the 1990s been well 
managed in terms of preventing overfishing. The damage of the public image of professional 
fishing brought about by the collapse of fisheries in the 1980s and 1990s, plus ongoing media 
coverage of overfishing as a global problem has led to a low degree of trust in both 
government and the fishing industry well documented in studies (Mazur, Curtis, and 
Bodsworth 2014, 12). The failure to communicate to the public that Australian fisheries are 
by and large sustainably managed has contributed to the industry’s lack of social license to 
operate. 
Social license can be defined as “the level of acceptance or approval continually 
granted to an organization’s operations or project by the local community and other 
stakeholders” (Mazur, Curtis, and Bodsworth 2014, 38). Lack of social license means a lack 
of goodwill and can give rise to a range of problems, key among which is maintaining access 
to the resource. Wild fish stocks are a common resource to which governments grant access. 
If the professional fishing industry does not have goodwill with the constituency, they are 
more likely to lose out when recreational fishing or conservation groups call for government 
to exclude professional fishing from certain estuaries and coastal areas. Social license is a key 
preoccupation for the Australian fishing industry: “For Seafood Industry Australia [a national 
peak body representing the fishing industry] I would reflect on the members’ advisory forum 
that we had yesterday and the key issue the number one issue that came out of that is social 
licence” (Lovell 2017, n.p.).  
The loss of public trust in the fishing industry is seen as a shared failure by 
government and industry to transmit to the community the sustainable management of the 
resource.  
 
 [W]e worked twenty to thirty years to change and to improve our processes and to 
work on sustainability. We need to be acknowledged for that. We want to be 
acknowledged for that. And science and research has acknowledged us but that hasn’t 
led into sufficient communication back to the community. (Seafood industry 
organization representative, pers. comm., February 8, 2018) 
Industry recognizes that it is their responsibility to communicate about their 
sustainability credentials to the public, and some initiatives have attempted to do that in 
recent years. There is, however, limited capacity, especially for smaller companies. 
I think the fishers know they have to do it [improve social license], but they don’t 
know how and they’re too busy fishing and too busy surviving because they, you 
know, what was coming out of yesterday’s meeting was this fear of access, keeping 
their access to fishing is their main priority. (Seafood industry consultant, pers. 
comm., March 8, 2018) 
Government actors recognize that government is also responsible for communicating 
about the effectiveness of fisheries management to help rebuild the social acceptability lost 
with overfishing in the past. They have, however, been slow to address the problem, and still 
tend to remain focused on the technical aspects of fishery management. The Fisheries 
Research and Development Corporation (FRDC) that manages research funding for fishing 
and aquaculture industries was only enabled by the legislation to invest in marketing from 
2018 onwards (FRDC 2018b). 
Some of our issues with social licence come from our lack of focus on educating the 
public and the community about how well we manage our fisheries. (Fisheries 
manager, pers. comm., March 23, 2018) 
The Western Australian state commitment to MSC is fantastic but the missing links 
are definitely the chain of custody involvement in the project and the communication 
aspects. That kind of money was ring-fenced towards fishery improvements and 
certification but not necessarily thinking about how to bring that message back to 
consumers or to communities. (Nongovernmental organization representative, pers. 
comm., November 16, 2017) 
The disconnection between efforts to manage the harvest of fish sustainably and the 
lack of tools to address sustainability concerns in downstream processes is thus the result of 
 
two main factors: the lack of involvement by public governors in the space and the partial 
success of private governors in filling the regulatory gap. The lack of a regulatory level 
playing field between domestic and imported seafood is aggravated by a lack of effective 
communication about the sustainability credentials of Australian fisheries to the general 
public. This leads to a lack of goodwill and uncertain access to fisheries resources. 
 
Consuming Legal, Reported, and Regulated Fish 
The problems detailed in this chapter have arisen from the lack of government involvement in 
sustainability beyond the act of fishing. This policy gap has had an effect further down the 
supply chain, with seafood industry representatives seeking government regulation in the 
retail sphere. In Australia, the main industry demand has been to lift the exemption contained 
in the Food Standards that allows food service outlets (fish and chip shops, restaurants, etc.) 
to sell seafood without specifying its country of origin. This strategy relies on perceived 
premiums for fresh local domestic product and aims to avoid product substitution and to 
explain potential price differentiation between Australian and imported products. Because of 
the relative stringency of Australian fisheries management, labeling seafood as Australian has 
also been seen as a proxy for sustainability. The low public awareness of these efforts, 
discussed previously, is a major flaw in this strategy.  
The extension of Country of Origin labeling for seafood in the food service sector has 
so far only been implemented in the Northern Territory using the avenue enabled through the 
Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) that regulates the requirements for fish retailer licenses. Although 
the demand was initially granted a positive recommendation of Senate Committee inquiry 
into labeling requirements citing the need of a level playing field for domestic and imported 
product (Commonwealth of Australia 2014, 27), the Productivity Commission has more 
recently recommended against the extension (Productivity Commission 2016, 41–42). The 
Commission provided a clear reminder that environmental provisions belong to the private 
domain: “Consumer health and safety interests would not be enhanced by such a policy 
change, and there are practical impediments to implementation. If such arrangements are 
desired to better meet consumer preferences, industry should apply them voluntarily” 
(Productivity Commission 2016, 267).  
In recent times, a possible instrument to address sustainability concerns in a form 
compatible with legal frameworks for international trade, food safety, and consumer 
protection has been located in the control of the legality of seafood. The attention to the 
lawful sourcing of fish is linked to the emergence of illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
 
(IUU) fishing as a global issue over the past two decades. IUU fishing is considered to 
constitute a major threat to the sustainability of fisheries and its prevention is included as an 
indicator in the Sustainable Development Goal 14 (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] 
2016, 80).  
The fight against IUU has highlighted the economic dimension of fishing and the 
importance of preventing IUU products from entering the supply chain through port state and 
trade-related measures (Witbooi 2014, 293). Trade-related measures aim to prevent seafood 
originating from IUU fishing from entering markets by requiring traceability documentation 
covering the transit of fish from the ocean to the supply chain. Such measures may be 
multilateral, as in the case of catch documentation schemes (Agnew 2000), or unilateral, as 
implemented by the European Union (Elvestad and Kvalvik 2015) and the United States 
(Simões and Dolle 2016). These measures have been accepted under the World Trade 
Organization regime (Tsamenyi et al. 2010, 30–31). Trade scholars conclude that, despite the 
challenges they pose to the trade regime, trade-related measures “may have become one of 
the few practical options to urge uncooperative flag, production, and reexporting states to 
contribute to and actively engage in the global campaign against IUU fishing” (He 2017, 
197).  
In the European Union and the United States, anti-IUU trade-related measures have 
been justified in terms of fisheries management—pursuing environmental, economic and 
social sustainability of fisheries—on the grounds that (1) IUU fishing may distort market 
conditions and undermine the economic opportunities of legitimate, well-managed fisheries; 
(2) there is a need to establish equal controls and a level playing field for imported and 
domestic product; and (3) there is a threat posed by IUU fishing to the sustainability of the 
oceans (Department of Commerce—National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
2014; European Union [EU] 2008, 1). Although the long-term effect of these measures 
remains to be assessed, they have been evaluated as “likely to become prevalent and 
embedded in parts of national, regional, sub-regional and international fisheries governance 
arrangements to ensure sustainable and responsible fishing practices” (Tsamenyi et al. 2010, 
31). This signals the success of a new approach to justify environmental provisions in the 
trade regime by shifting such concerns from the realm of consumer values to the prevention 
of market distortions. Measures to prevent IUU thus constitute a new proxy for sustainability 
that aims at reconciling the conservation of the oceans with its sustainable exploitation—by 
ensuring that fishing is regulated and seafood harvested legitimately. 
 
Australia has been one of the pioneers in the adoption of multilateral trade–related 
measures to prevent IUU fishing for its export fisheries (Agnew 2000). However, the 
adoption of EU-style measures for the domestic market have been objected to by most 
stakeholders, including fisheries managers: 
Traceability and labelling is attracting increasing attention in international fisheries 
management. Some countries are seeking more information on where and how 
seafood was caught and whether it is consistent with international, regional and 
domestic fisheries regulations. Unilateral market measures taken by an importing 
country can be trade restrictive in that they do not necessarily recognise equivalent or 
better arrangements put in place by other countries with differing approaches. Some, 
including the EU and the US, have already implemented market state certification 
requirements that have caused additional requirements for some Australian seafood 
exporters. (Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Submission 11, 4) 
This objection rests on the key acknowledgment that traceability and labeling are 
matters of interest for fisheries management. As explored in this chapter, this is not the case 
in Australia, where traceability and labeling are firmly located in the food safety and 
consumer frameworks. Instead, fisheries management is disengaged from the postharvest 
regulatory space and the industry has focused on country of origin as a proxy for 
sustainability. So far, the potential of anti-IUU measures on imports through traceability 
schemes has failed to attract the attention of the majority of producers, as well as of the 
Australian fisheries management authorities. 
 
The lack of sustainability requirements in the postharvest space continues to produce a 
disconnection in Australia between the efforts to preserve fishery resources and their 
sustainable exploitation as a food product. Measures to prevent seafood that has not been 
legally caught in a well-regulated fishery entering the market through traceability 
documentation would address environmental concerns related to seafood. The existing 
regulatory framework in Australia fails to accommodate this. The involvement of fisheries 
management to address concerns in the postharvest space seems a necessary precondition to 
bridge this gap. However, it remains to be seen whether possible competitive advantages for 
Australian fisheries will lead the industry to pursue improvements in the traceability of all 
 
seafood sold, and whether the Australian fisheries managers will be willing to venture out of 
fisheries regulation and into trade regulation.  
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